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CHICAGO-KENT

III.

LAW REVIEW

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES.

Attention paid to jurisdictional requirements at the outset of
litigation may save hours of effort which might otherwise be spent
fruitlessly in the conduct of suits incapable of achieving anything
of value if those requirements be neglected. There is no evidence,
in the recent decisions, that any debatable questions have arisen
concerning the power of the Illinois courts to exercise their jurisdiction as that term relates to their ability to hear and determine
particular categories of proceedings. Some cases involving aspects
of jurisdiction in terms of control over the parties are noteworthy,
however.
The provision of the Civil Practice Act which permits the use
of substituted service of summons in actions in personam' has, in
the main, produced little dispute, and that only of the factual
variety, for the legislative language is clear and accords with all
requirements of due process. The case of Mahler v. Segel 2 is
entitled to notice because it grew out of the fairly standard and
common practice for persons, former residents of the state, to
leave a mailing address or a telephone listing with some relative
through whom communication with the non-resident might be
established. If, in fact, permanent residence has been established
elsewhere, the retention of these symbols of residence within the
state will not, according to the holding therein, be enough to
support substituted service upon the relative as a "person of the
family," nor can the premises so listed be regarded as a "usual
place of abode." In that respect, the abstract decision in Conley
v. McNamara3 may prove interesting for the headnote thereto
would indicate that service on a step-daughter who maintained
her separate apartment on the second floor of a building owned by
defendant, whose separate living quarters were on the first floor,
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 137.
2 333 Il. App. 138, 76 N. E. (2d) 795 (1948).
3 334 Il1. App. 396, 79 N. E. (2d) 645 (1948).
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was a nullity despite the return of the sheriff that process was
served at the usual place of abode and on a member of the defendant's family.
Since the filing of a motion in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis is the equivalent of the bringing of a new suit, it is
essential that the court should, before ruling on the motion, reacquire jurisdiction over the parties to the original proceeding.
Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, while authorizing the use of
such motion, is silent on the point of how that jurisdiction is to
be reacquired other than to note that any error is to be corrected only "upon reasonable notice. '"4
It was held, in Calkin v. Roberts Park Fire Protection District,5 that service of
such a notice on the attorney who represented the successful party
in the original proceeding, particularly when sent by mail, was
not sufficient for the purpose. A decision of that character appears
to be eminently sound when it is recalled that an attorney ceases
to have authority to act for, or to bind, the client after rendition
of judgment," and that, in the absence of statutory direction to the
7
contrary, proper service customarily means personal service.
Somewhat allied to the problem of seeing to it that the court
has acquired jurisdiction is the related matter of deciding whether
jurisdiction, once acquired, should be retained. In that regard,
the Federal Judicial Code has established a firm basis for the
application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to suits
brought in district courts elsewhere than at the situs of the wrong
or distant from the domicile of the parties.8 Few state statutes
exist on the subject, however, and there is no act in point in
Illinois, perhaps because of doubt as to the constitutionality of
legislation which might purport to limit the privileges and immuni4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 196.

5398 Ill. 374, 76N. E. T2d) 43 (1947).
6 Watson v. Trinz, 274 Ill. App. 379 (1934).
362, 103 N. E. 1000 (1914).
7 Haj v. American Bottle Co., 261 Ill.

But see note in
26 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVImV 348 on the case of Ziff v. Sandra Frocks. Inc., 331
Ill. App. 353, 73 N. E. (2d) 327 (1947), to the effect that service by mail may sometimes be sufficient.
8 28 U. S. C. A. § 1404(a).
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ties of the citizens of the several states.9 Certainly, prior Illinois
cases have upheld the right of the non-resident citizen to sue here,
0
even upon causes of action which accrued elsewhere,' it having
been the policy of the local courts to exercise their functions on
behalf of litigants without regard to matters of residence or nonresidence.1 1 The determination of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Whitney v. Madden12 is, therefore, the more remarkable for it
there decided that, despite the absence of legislation on the point,
the local court was empowered to apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens if, in its discretion, the case warranted it, even to the
point of dismissing the suit brought by the non-resident. The
case was, without doubt, one calling for the application of the
doctrine for it was begun by a non-resident plaintiff against a
non-resident defendant without assets in Illinois on a tort cause
of action arising in another state and the trial thereof would require extensive travel by the witnesses at considerable expense.
The action taken, if otherwise proper, clearly represents a sound
exercise of judicial discretion. Illinois must now be added to the
small, but growing, group of states which treat with this vexing
problem from an equitable standpoint.
The pleader should, of course, be conscious of the fact that the
action he contemplates bringing should be promptly brought to
avoid the possibility of it being barred by limitation. In that
regard, it may be noted that the impact of modern methods of
mass publication and circulation of newspapers, magazines, and
the like, has made itself felt not only on doctrines concerning tort
liability for defamation but also on those relating to limitation on
the right to sue. Historically, each delivery and sale of the defamatory publication gave rise to a separate cause of action and,
9 U. S. Const., Art.

IV, § 2.

10 Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 197 N. E.

578 (1935) ; Babcock v. Farwell, 245 I1. 14, 91 N. E. 683, 137 Am. St. Rep. 284
(1910).
11 Even in divorce cases, where residence is usually a jurisdictional prerequisite,
the non-resident may sue in Illinois if the ground for divorce relied on arose in the
state: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 3.
12 400 Ill. 185, 79 N. E. (2d) 593 (1948).
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although some of those causes might be barred, still others might
be the subject of suit. 13 The modern trend, however, has been
to regard the composition, printing and distribution of libelous
material in newspaper or magazine form as constituting but a
single tort,1 4 from which fact there has been developed the subordinate concept that, if the cause of action based thereon is barred,
no suit may be maintained unless there be a true reissue of the
defamatory article. The Appellate Court for the First District,
in Winrod v. Time, Inc., 15 has now seen fit to accept that view
for it upheld the defense of the statute of limitations 16 against
the contention that the release of miscellaneous copies, incidental
to the general circulation, should serve to keep the action alive.
That a claim once barred by the statute of limitations may be
revived by a new promise is familiar law. In such event, the
new period of limitation commences to run with the making of
the new promise. 1 7 To be effective for this purpose, however,
the new promise should be one of unqualified character for, since
the well-reasoned opinion in Boone v. A'Hern,8 a conditional
promise, such as one to pay "when able," has been regarded as
insufficient unless the promisee could show satisfaction of the condition. The case of Hurtt v. Steven,'9 therefore, is noteworthy
in two respects. In the first place, it decides that an acknowledgment of an old debt in the form of a statement that the promisor
would send "some money just as soon as I possibly can," was
an unqualified promise making it unnecessary to show an ability
to pay. In the second place, the court determined that the limitation period was not to be measured from the date of the making
13 See note in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REvIEw 278 to the case of Winrod v.
McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (1945).
14 Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. (2d) 676 (1939),
affirming 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 640 (1938).
15334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E. 708 (1948).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 14, requires that suits for slander or libel be filed
within one year although other personal tort actions need not be commenced prior
to two years after the cause of action accrued.
17 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 83, § 17.
Is 98 Ill. App. 610 (1901).
19333 Ill. App. 181, 77 N. E. (2d) 204 (1948).
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of the quoted statement but rather was to commence upon the
lapse of a reasonable time thereafter. Such conclusion was said
to be necessary on the theory that if the debtor had said, for
example, that he would pay eleven years after the date of the
acknowledgment, the suit would be barred by lapse of time prior
to the moment when, by that acknowledgment, the money would
become due. The purported analogy would seem unsound for if,
as the court said, the promise to pay when able was an unqualified one then, since it specified no fixed time for its performance,
it became a debt due on demand.
Choice of an appropriate remedy is also important for, despite the supposed abolition of distinctions heretofore existing
between actions, 20 suits today must still follow along the same
theories and be modelled along the lines of earlier remedies. No
new issues have been observed concerning law actions, but some
points have been made over suits of equitable character and cases
of statutory cognizance. In Smith v. Ladage,21 the Illinois Supreme Court had occasion to advert to a well-established but little
known principle which permits a court of equity, at the instance
of any relative or friend of the deceased person, to enjoin against
the defacing or desecration of any grave in land devoted to public
burial purposes. The court emphasized that fact that, after a
burial, the interested persons are entitled to go to the grave for
the purpose of caring for and beautifying it. Such a right, being in the nature of an easement, is sufficiently a property right
to permit of its protection under law whether it be invaded by
the acts of mere trespassers or by the unauthorized conduct of
the persons in control of the cemetery.
Absence of adequate remedy at law has long been the occasion for intervention by equity. It was for that reason that the
court was prompted to act in Factly v. Factly.22 Certain parents
had there deeded a farm to their son in consideration for which
20 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110. § 155.
21397 1Il. 336, 74 N. E. (2d) 497 (1947).
22 333 IMl. App. 611, 78 N. E. (2d) 137 (1948).
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the son, by a separate contract, agreed to permit his parents to
reside on the farm for the rest of their lives. After his father's
death, the undutiful son did everything in his power short of
physical violence to make life miserable for his aged and feeble
mother in an effort to force her to vacate the premises. When
the mother sued to enjoin the son from continuing to perpetuate
his harassing tactics, the defendant contended that equity had no
jurisdiction over the breach of contract. The court, after detailing the defendant's many malicious acts designed to make his
mother's stay miserable, came to the conclusion there was no
adequate remedy at law to deal with such a person and only
equity could provide the quick and effective remedy called for by
contumelious conduct of that character.
In contrast, however, stands the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, affirming the action taken by the Appellate Court
reported last year, 23 in the case of Montgomery Ward & Company v. United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees
Union, C. I. 0.24 The court there declared that, in the absence
of a showing of violence, sedition, violation of property right,
breach of trust or contract, or of trade libel amounting to unfair
competition, no injunction could be issued to prevent either the
actual or threatened release of publications of defamatory character, or to prevent the occurrence of libel or slander.
Litigants intending to utilize the speedy and inexpensive declaratory judgment method of adjudicating legal disputes, now
provided by statute, 25 should not overlook the fact that first, there
must be an actual controversy, and second, the court should have
all necessary parties before it to enter a binding declaration of
rights. The case of Saline Branch Drainage District v. UrbanaChampaign Sanitary District26 serves to illustrate the necessity
for observing these requirements for the court there held it proper
23 See note thereto in 26 CHicAoo-KENT LAW RE;viEw 35-6.

24400 I1. 38, 79 N. E. (2d) 46 (1948), affirming 330 Il. App. 49, 70 N. E. (2d) 75
(1946).
25 I1. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
26 399 I1. 189, 77 N. E. (2d) 158 (1948).
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to dismiss such a proceeding when it appeared that the complaint
lacked sufficient allegations to show the existence of a justiciable
controversy over the constitutionality of a statute27 and, even
if it did, it was apparent that certain necessary parties had been
omitted from the proceeding. The court also adverted to the fact
that there might be occasion to question the appropriateness of
such a proceeding when coercive litigation over the subject matter
was already pending between the parties before another court.
While the section of the Civil Practice Act authorizing the use
of declaratory judgment proceedings extends to the point of permitting the defendant to seek comparable relief by way of counterclaim, whether injected into a pending declaratory judgment
proceeding or any other type of suit, 28 it does not clearly appear therefrom that one sued in such a case has a right to turn
the proceeding into an offensive action by the use of a counterclaim for affirmative relief other than for a declaration of rights.
Such a counterclaim was used, however, in the case of Western
Foundry Company v. Wicker 2 9 and affirmative relief was granted
to defendant thereon, apparently without objection from the
plaintiff that the use thereof converted a diplomatic discussion into
a passage of arms. There is occasion, therefore, to raise a cautioning note to the action taken in that case against the possibility that it might become a binding precedent in a yet uncertain
field.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS.

Surprisingly little has been said about the essentials of good
pleading or the manner of statement which should be found therein, but some observations have been made about some aspects of
the subject. Without doubt, no suit should be conducted in the
absence of the proper parties for the work of the judiciary will
be improperly and unnecessarily increased thereby. For that
27 The action appeared to be one seeking a declaration that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947,
Ch. 42, § 57b was unconstitutional.
28 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 181.1(2).
29 335 Ill. App. 106, 80 N. E. (2d) 548 (1948).
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reason, the Civil Practice Act provides adequate machinery, by
motion or by answer, through which to raise the question, in the
trial court, of either a misjoinder or a nonjoinder.3 0 If, however, the parties do not see fit to raise such questions in the trial
court, 3 1 they will be denied the right to complain of the error
on appeal, according to Anson v. Haywood,32 which reiterates the
3
rule as it was applied under prior statutes. 3
Related to the problem of joining parties is the problem of
joining causes of action. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, it was unquestioned law that a judge sitting in a divorce case had no power to settle the property rights of the
spouses except at the time of, and incident to, the granting of a
decree for divorce. 3 4 With the adoption of the liberal provisions
therein contained respecting the right to join several but distinct
claims in a complaint 35 and the correlative right of a defendant
to interpose distinct and unrelated claims by way of counterclaim, along with the amendment of the Divorce Act designed to
bring the procedure in divorce cases into conformity with that
pertaining to other civil proceedings, 36 there was occasion to believe that a court might permit a divorce suit to be turned into
an open forum for the complete liquidation of all rights of the
parties. If so, there would appear to be ample warrant in the
Civil Practice Act, on counterclaim, to grant relief to a defendant concerning property questions even though the court might
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 169(1). Section 149 of the statute indicates the
means through which necessary parties may be added.
31 The court, in Anson v. Haywood, 397 Ill. 370 at 380, 74 N. E. (2d) 489 at 494
(1947), reasoned that a defect in parties plaintiff, growing out of the fact that only
one of two joint promisees had sued, could be reached by motion pursuant to Section 48(c) of the Civil Practice Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 172(c), because
the plaintiff had not "legal capacity to sue." It is questionable if such a motion
would lie, since the "legal capacity" there referred to deals more with disabilities
such as would arise from the fact that plaintiff is an alien enemy or the like rather
than matters bearing on his "right" to sue. See comment on Classen v. Heil, 330
Ill. App. 433, 71 N. E. (2d) 537 (1947), in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 38-9.
32 397 111. 370, 74 N. E. (2d) 489 (1947).
33 See Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N. E. 307 (1934) ; Bittner v. Field, 354
Ill. 215, 188 N. E. 342 (1933) ; Hill v. Sifferman, 230 Ill. 19, 82 N. E. 338 (1907).
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 18.
35 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 168.
36 Ibid., Ch. 40, § 7.
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see fit, for the time being, to defer action on the complaint for
divorce or might even decide to deny dissolution of the marriage,3 7
provided the issues could be stated and tried separately. The
Illinois Supreme Court, however, in the case of Klajbor v. Klajbor,38 without making any reference to the interpolated procedural provisions of the Civil Practive Act, frowned on any such
practice by reversing a decree settling the property issues raised
by a counterclaim because the court had not taken up, nor had
it decided, the divorce aspects of the case. There may be valid
reason why a divorce proceeding should be treated as sui generis
and limited to the matrimonial aspects of the case, but inasmuch
as the legislature has seen fit to permit the divorce judge to
investigate the property rights of the parties and has not seen
fit to deprive him of his general functions while serving as a
chancellor, there would seem to be just reason why the court
could well have reached a contrary result.3 9
Although Section 34 of the Civil Practice Act directs that
every complaint shall contain specific prayers for relief, 40 the
former chancery practice of including a general prayer still persists despite an effort to abolish it. 41 The wisdom of the practice
was well illustrated in the case of Anson v. Haywood42 where the
action of the trial court, in granting relief other than that specifically sought, was approved because the complaint also contained a prayer for general relief. 4 3 It should be noted, however, that the defendant appeared and participated in the case
Ibid., Ch. 110, § 174, permits more than one judgment in the same cause.
353 (1947). Treatment of a similar problem, but
one growing out of an action for separate maintenance, is dealt with elsewhere in
this survey. See discussion of the case of Olmsted v. Olmsted, 332 Ill. App. 454,
75 N. E. (2d) 774 (1947), noted post in Section V under the heading of Family Law.
39 The only procedural objection to such a practice might be found to rest in Rule
10 of the Illinois Supreme Court, which directs that matters within the jurisdiction
of a court of equity shall be stated as a single equitable cause of action without
See
being set forth in separate counts and without the use of the term "count."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 259.10.
40 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 158.
41 See Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Annotated (Foundation Press, Inc., Chicago, 1933), p. 73.
42 397 Ill. 370; 74 N. E. (2d) 489 (1947).
43 For the former practice, see Churchill v. Marr, 300 Ill. 302, 133 N. E. 335
37

38398 Ill. 152, 75 N. E. (2d)

(1921).
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and made no claim of surprise. It is doubtful if the same result
would have followed had the defendant seen fit to default and no
attempt had been made to amend the complaint.
There is some comfort for the erring pleader in the fact that
the Civil Practice Act contains quite liberal provisions for amendment, at least prior to trial.4 4 Little has been said by the courts,
however, with regard to the litigant's right to file amended pleadings after judgment has been entered.4 5 The statute then limits
the right to amend to those changes designed to conform the
pleadings to the proof adduced at the trial.4 6 It was for that
reason that the court, in People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern
University,47 affirmed the action of the trial court in denying the
relator permission to file an additional count to the mandamus
petition for the proposed amendment sought to inject new issues
not brought out at the trial.4 s
Some elaboration on the defense of res judicata is provided
by the case of People v. Kidd,49 at least as that defense may be
concerned in quo warranto proceedings. Such a suit may be
instituted in Illinois by the proper public official acting in his
official capacity or may be brought by him at the request of an
individual relator.5 0 When brought, however, the case is entitled
in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, the sovereign
state being more than a nominal plaintiff. According to that
case, therefore, a determination made in the proceeding conducted on behalf of the individual relator is to be regarded as
binding should the public official later attempt to sue on the
same cause in his official capacity.
44 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 170(1).
45 See note in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEW 244 to the case of Bollaert v.
Kankakee Tile & Brick Co., 317 Ill. App. 120, 45 N. E. (2d) 506 (1942), as to
whether jurisdiction exists in the trial court to permit amendment after notice of
appeal has been filed, and note in 24 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvlEw 262 to the case of
Leffers v. Hayes, 327 Ill. App. 440, 64 N. E. (2d) 768 (1946), on whether the
reviewing court should have power in such a situation.
46 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 170(3).
47 333 Ill. App. 224, 77 N. E. (2d) 345 (1948).
48 See also McGlaughlin v. Pickerel, 381 Ill. 574, 46 N. E. (2d) 368 (1943).
49 398 111. 405, 75 N. E. (2d) 851 (1947).
50 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 112, § 2.
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THE TRIAL OF THE CASE.

Prompt disposition of a case can be made, by either party,
without the expense of trial, in those situations falling within the
compass of Section 57 of the Civil Practice Act dealing with summary judgment procedure. 5 1 It might be noted, however, that
the only orders which may be entered upon motion for summary
judgment are those designed (1) to secure to the movant the
relief sought, (2) or to obtain partial relief in a proper case,
or (3) to deny the motion. If the latter be ordered, the case
remains pending and the court would have no authority, in the
absence of a similar motion made by the defendant, to dismiss
the case even though the affidavits offered in support of the motion clearly disclose that plaintiff has no legal basis for a recovery. Because defendant had neglected to present a countermotion for summary judgment, the court found it necessary, in
Cooper v. Liberty National Bank of Chicago,5 2 to send the case
back for further proceedings despite the fact that, in overruling
a summary judgment which had been granted to plaintiff, it clearly
indicated that the defendant ought not be burdened with the expense of a trial which could end only in his favor.
The extent to which the legislature, at one time concerned in
keeping statutory remedies separate and distinct from the ordinary civil proceedings," has produced conformity in the processes of litigation is illustrated by the decision in Barrett v.
Bender.5 4 The court there upheld the right to use a motion for
summary judgment in a forcible detainer proceeding, by reason
of the conformity section of the statute regulating such cases, 55
even though it was urged that the county court, on appeal from
a justice of the peace, could exercise no more power than the
51 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 181.

52 332 Ill. App. 459, 75 N. E. (2d) 769 (1947).
53 II. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 125, purports to exclude some ten named statutory proceedings from the operation of the procedural law to be applied in general
civil proceedings.
54 334 Ill. App. 135, 78 N. E. (2d) 832 (1948).
55 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 57, § 11.
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judge before whom the case originated.5 6 The right to use summary judgment may well be limited, according to Conrad v. Beaubien,57 despite the fact that the case falls within the statutory
classification, if the issues are complicated and reference to a
master would be more desirable to arrive at the details of an accounting than to attempt to glean the facts from an inspection of
affidavits.
If trial should become necessary, the litigant may well be
concerned about obtaining the evidence necessary to support the
case or defense set forth in his pleadings. Resort to methods for
discovery may often be necessary, and pre-trial conference practices may prove helpful. The Illinois Supreme Court, however,
has seen fit to say, through the medium of the decision in People
ex rel. Prince v. Graber,5 8 that the non-resident plaintiff cannot
be compelled or coerced, through any rule or statute, to submit
to pretrial discovery save and except as the same may be obtained in the form of a deposition taken at the place of the plaintiff's residence5 9 The value of the procedure established by
Section 58(2) of the Civil Practice Act, 60 and by the rule adopted
to reinforce the same, 61 has thereby been diminished, the local
litigant suffering in the conflict between the right to sue on the
one hand and the right to discover the facts necessary to establish a defense on the other. In attempting to evaluate that case,
it might be mentioned that when a plaintiff submits his cause to
a court he consents to be bound by all reasonable rules adopted
by that particular tribunal, even to the point where he may face
56 The earlier case of First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Bohnhorst, 305 Ill. App. 251,
27 N. E. (2d) 319 (1940), had recognized the right of plaintiff, in forcible detainer
suits, to add new parties after appeal to the circuit court pursuant to Il. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 110, § 150.
57 334 Ill. App. 198, 78 N. E. (2d) 846 (1948).
58 397 Ill. 522, 74 N. E. (2d) 865 (1947), noted in 36 Il. B. J. 296 and 46 Mich.
L. Rev. 986.
59 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 51, § 26.
60 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 182(2).
61 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 259.19(1).
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dismissal of his cause for refusal to comply therewith.6 2 The
fact that he is a non-resident should not relieve him of this requirement, for to grant relief on that ground would place him in
a favored position over the local resident.
Use of the pre-trial conference6 3 as a means through which
time devoted to trial may be lessened and issues may be simplified provides a welcome adjunct to the expeditious handling of
litigation. Warning was served, by the holding in Wiggins v.
Heim, 64 however, that the effectiveness of pre-trial conference is
apt to be lost if the results thereof do not become incorporated
in an order, entered prior to trial, designed to control the subsequent course of the action.6 5 For failure to have such an order,
and because the parties differed as to the product of the pre-trial
conference, it became necessary to reverse the determination
therein and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Probably more civil cases now brought before the courts are
tried by the judge alone than is true of those heard by juries,
but the privilege of jury trial still remains, in an appropriate
situation, if demanded. The zeal displayed by the Illinois Supreme Court, in Stephens v. Kasten,6 6 to insure that a litigant
should not be denied his right to trial by jury through the neglect or oversight of his counsel, was re-echoed in the more recent
case of Mason v. Continental Distributing Company, Inc. 67 The
plaintiff therein had filed a complaint which sounded both in law
for breach of contract and also for declaratory judgment. The
prayer for relief also contained a jury demand. Defendant, as62 In general, see Sibbach v. Wilson & Company, Inc., 312 U. S. 1. 61 S. Ct. 422,
85 L. Ed. 479 (1941), holding that the proper remedy for refusal to comply with
Rule 35 of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Procedure, 28 U. S. C. A. foll. § 723c, concerning
submission to physical examination, is dismissal of the suit rather than punishment
for contempt.
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 182a.
64 332 Ill. App. 403, 75 N. E. (2d) 381 (1947).
65 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 259.23A, directs that the court shall make an
order reciting the agreements of the parties and which shall be designed to limit
"the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of
counsel," unless modified by the trial judge.
66 383 Ill. 127, 48 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943).
67 333 Ill. App. 128, 76 N. E. (2d) 780 (1948).
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suming that plaintiff had paid the necessary jury fee, made no
demand for jury trial at the time of filing his appearance 6" but
instead moved to dismiss the complaint. When defendant's motion was sustained, plaintiff secured leave to prepare and file
an amended complaint based solely on the legal demand. The
amended complaint omitted any reference to trial by jury. Defendant belatedly filed a jury demand, paid the fee, and moved
to transfer the cause to the jury calendar. The request was denied by the trial court as being presented too late. That action
was held to be an abuse of discretion on the ground that plaintiff, by filing an amended complaint, had waived his right to trial
by jury but that such action could not be permitted to militate
against the defendant even though he did not become conscious
of the fact until later. The proviso in Section 64(1) of the Civil
Practice Act, requiring that defendant shall appropriately signify his desire for trial by jury at the time when plaintiff waives
his demand,6 9 must now be read as if limited to cases of positive waiver so as to avoid any element of surprise.
Selection and impanelling of the jury still leads to difficulty,
especially in automobile tort cases where the danger of intimation to prospective jurors of the existence of insurance is an everpresent possibility. The Supreme Court, in Wheeler v. Rudick ,70
has again dealt with the problem but without clarifying its prior
holdings on the subject. The court there gave plaintiff's attorney
permission to interrogate the jurors as to their possible interest
in the insuring company after the attorney had submitted an
affidavit stating that he had reasonable grounds for believing
that potential jurors might be privy to the insurer. On appeal, the
questioning was held to constitute error since the affidavit did
not establish that the inquiry was made in good faith, but rather
for the prohibited power of suggestion.
68 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 188(1).

69 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 188(1), declares: "If the plaintiff files a jury demand and
thereafter waives such demand, the defendant shall be granted a jury trial upon
motion made at the time of such waiver and upon payment of the proper fees to the
clerk." Italics added.
70397 I1. 438, 74 N. E. (2d) 601 (1947), noted In 36 111. B. J. 250.
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It would be difficult to model a procedure at this point in
which the rights of both plaintiff and defendant would be properly protected. Affidavits are not satisfactory in their limited
scope, particularly where the recitals of fact can hardly be within the ascertainment of diligent counsel. Legislative authority for
a juror's questionnaire has been suggested, 71 but this would seem
to be as clumsy and as inconclusive a method as the affidavit. The
whole problem could be eliminated, by bringing the issue out into
the open, through a statute authorizing the joinder of the insurance carrier as a party defendant in the tort action.
Only one case involved rules regulating the admission of testimony, that of In re Estate of Busse, 72 wherein the Appellate
Court for the Second District reaffirmed well-recognized principles
governing the relationship of attorney and client which principles, in turn, render testimony of the attorney incompetent as to
conversations held in his presence with his client and others. The
claimant therein had managed property of the client for a number of years and had also taken some personal care of her before her death. On one occasion, while both client and claimant
were in the attorney's office discussing business affairs which included the winding up of the client's husband's estate, a complaint was registered by the claimant against the client which
might be characterized as indicating a lack of co-operation. To
this complaint, the client addressed the claimant and said, "You
are going to get your $5,000, don't worry about it, of course I
cannot pay you now, but I will as soon as the property is sold."
Such conversation was held to be privileged and the attorney
was declared to be incompetent to testify thereto.
Where the client is present with "others" who are the agents,
servants or employees of the client, the communications or conversations between the client and the others, conducted in the
presence of the attorney, are privileged. That rule could not be
controverted if the conversations relate to matters which are
71
72

See note in 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 986.
332 Ill. App. 258, 75 N. E. (2d) 36 (1947).
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under discussion between client and lawyer when the latter is
acting in his advisory capacity, but the conclusion would not
necessarily be valid if the subject matter were only collateral to
or beyond the periphery of the instant purpose of the client's
visit. 73 It is at this point of bifurcation, however, that the decision may be criticized for the factual situation was susceptible of
the alternative of calling the testimony of the attorney admissible
and not incompetent because of the privilege. The overtones of
75
Dickerson v. Dickerson74 prevailed over those of Oard v. Dolan,
which had been relied upon by claimant. The decision is hard,
in the case setting, for there will apparently be no other way for
the claimant to introduce evidence to sustain his claim.
A hearing before commissioners appointed by the state supreme court to investigate charges of unprofessional conduct
made against a member of the bar is, in some respects, analogous
to a trial in that witnesses may appear and give testimony under oath. It was urged, in the matter of In re Roth7 6 that it
was error to permit such witnesses to be sworn by an ordinary
notary public inasmuch as the latter had authority to administer oaths only to witnesses in matters commenced or pending before the notary public, 77 hence lacked the power conferred on
clerks or other court officials. The court, however, pointed out
that commissioners of the kind in question constitute a factfinding body only; do not exercise judicial functions ;7' need not,
themselves, take the oath prescribed by the state constitution ;79
and, as a consequence, an oath administered to a witness before
them by a notary public was competent under Section 2 of the
statute regulating oaths and affirmations. 8 0
73 See analysis of this point in the comments on the instant case appearing in
61 Harv. L. Rev. 717 and 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 989.
74 322 Ill. 492, 153 N. E. 740 (1926).
75 320 Ill. 371, 151 N. E. 244 (1926).
76 398 Ill. 131, 75 N. E. (2d) 278 (1947).
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 101, § 1.
78 See In re Donaghy, 393 Ill. 621, 66 N. E. (2d) 856 (1946) ; In re McCallum,
391 Il. 400, 64 N. E. (2d) 310 (1945).
79 Ii. Const. 1870, Art. V, § 25.
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 101, § 2.
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Mention is made elsewhere of the action taken in Norwood
v. Norwood.81 It is proper to note here, however, that the case
provides some elaboration upon the circumstances which will permit a plaintiff to dismiss a suit, despite objection, after the case
has proceeded to trial8 2 and before judgment has been entered
therein.
Rendition of judgment has also posed a problem for judges
travelling on circuit. It is a familiar fact that a decree of equity,
unlike a judgment at law, possesses no validity until the determination of the chancellor is not only enrolled but also entered; the signature of the chancellor thereon serving to authorize the clerk to spread the decree on the court records. It was
also once a familiar fact that, if court was adjourned during
term time, the judge was powerless to reconvene the court prior
to the first day of the next succeeding term. In the meantime,
as the court was deemed to be on vacation, the judge was limited
to the exercise of only those powers enumerated in the statute 3
and could not perform other judicial acts, hence any decree not
entered before adjournment had to await the opening of the
next term of court. These factors led to one of the objections
propounded in Jackman v. North8 4 to a decree dismissing a will
contest suit for want of equity. It appeared therein that the
chancellor, having heard the case in Will County and having there
indicated the nature of the intended decree, subsequently went
to serve at Kankakee County in the same judicial circuit. After
the decree was enrolled, it was submitted to him at his chambers in Kankakee and was there signed. In due course it was
returned to and filed with the clerk of the court of Will County.
Under prior practice, such a decree might well have been regarded as invalid, but the court noted that, at the time of the
adoption of the Civil Practice Act, the statute relating to courts
81333 I1. App. 469, 77 N. E. (2d) 552 (1948), discussed post in Section V under
the heading of Family Law.
82 The practice is regulated by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1.947, Ch. 110, § 176.
83 Smith-Hurd Stat. 1927, Ch. 37, § 103.
84 398 Ill. 90, 75 N. E. (2d) 324 (1947).
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was also amended so as to provide that each term of court should
continue until the first day of the next term, thereby eliminating the idea of a period of vacation. 85 Such being the case, it
was held proper for the chancellor to place his signature upon
the decree during a period of adjournment, the act at Kankakee
not being one calling for the exercise of any judicial function necessarily appendant upon his presence in Will County, provided
he in no way undertook to modify or alter his earlier ruling pronounced while there.
DAMAGES

An amendment to the Wrongful Death Act 6 adopted in
1947 increased he amount of damages recoverable in such proceedings from $10,000 to $15,000. Without question, the higher
maximum recovery is applicable to suits based on wrongful acts
occurring after the passage of the amendment but the statute is
silent as to whether the benefit thereof attaches to claims arising before that time. That precise problem was presented to
the United States District Court, sitting in the Eastern District
of Illinois, through the medium of the case of Monroe v. ChaseT
wherein the plaintiff moved for permission to increase the ad damnumn of the complaint which had been filed to recover for a wrongful death occurring prior to the amendment of the statute. Leave
to amend was denied when the district judge decided that the
change in the statute was one concerning substantive rather than
adjective law and, there being no evidence of a legislative intent
to make the change operate retroactively, it could have prospective operation only. The case is probably only a forerunner of
others that may develop judging by the conflict in opinion expressed by nisi prius judges sitting in the state courts in Cook
County. 8 8
85 Ill. Rev. stat. 1947, Ch. 37, § 72.24.

86 Ibid., Ch. 70, § 2.
87 76 F. Supp. 278 (1947).
88 Compare Fisher, "Damages for Wrongful Death-$10,000 or $15,000-" 29 Chicago Bar Rec. 189, who favors retroactive operation, with Schnackenberg, "Damages
for Wrongful Death," 30 Chicago Bar Rec. 213, who is opposed.
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While more nearly a problem of substantive tort law, since
it concerns the scope of an action based on the Dram Shop Act,8 9
the case of Howlett v. McGarvey9 ° serves to introduce the question as to whether a relative of a deceased person, killed by an
intoxicated driver, may sue the tavern-keeper for an alleged injury to "property" there being, in that particular case, no evidence of injury to or deprivation of a means of support. Analogy
to actions for wrongful death, under which the law presumes
some damage if the next of kin bear a lineal relationship to the
deceased, 9 1 was held improper and, for want of proof of injury to tangible real or personal property, the action had to be
dismissed.
Attention was called last year to some striking changes made
in the law concerning the imposition of punitive damages in certain actions growing out of the family relation.9 2 As there has
been some criticism expressed concerning the possibility that
these changes are unconstitutional in the light of Section 19 of
Article II of the Illinois Constitution, the bar may be interested
to learn of an excellent discussion on the point by Judge Samuel
B. Epstein of the Superior Court of Cook County, prepared in
the form of an opinion for the guidance of nisi prius judges when
called upon to rule on preliminary motions addressed to pleadings
in such casesY3
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

While most appellate review is provided by higher tribunals,
the law still permits of a limited amount of review before the
trial court itself through proceedings in the nature of a writ of
error coram nobis filed pursuant to Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act.9 4 The essential characteristic of that motion lies in
89 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 135.
90334 Ill. App. 512, 79 N. E. (2d) 864 (1948).

Wilcox v. Bierd, 330 Ill. 571, 162 N. E. 170 (1928).
92 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 68, §§ 34 and 41, and Ch. 89, § 25.
98 Epstein, "Legislative Limitations on Amount of Damages Recoverable in 'Heart
Balm' Cases," 30 Chicago Bar Rec. 127.
94 11. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 196.
91
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the fact that it is an appropriate device to secure relief from a
judgment entered in error because the court was not informed
as to facts which, if known, would have prevented the pronouncement of the judgment thereby attacked. The modern motion,
however, is still circumscribed by the limitations which attached
to its common law counterpart. In Gustafson v. Lundquist,95
therefore, it was held error to grant such a motion to vacate
a default judgment where there was no showing of excusable lack
of diligence in moving to vacate within thirty days after the
In Bishopp v. Risser, 7 on the other
rendition of the judgment."
hand, it was held proper to deny such a motion which sought
merely to raise an issue of law as to the validity of the process
which had been served on the defaulting defendant. 8 Error of
that character may be questioned only by appeal or writ of
error before an appropriate reviewing tribunal.
If appeal is taken, it must necessarily be taken in apt time,
i. e., within thirty days after rendition of judgment in most civil
actions, or else the appeal will be dismissed on motion made for
that purpose. The case of Kruse v. Ballsmith,99 however, serves
notice that the time within which to appeal from a judgment for
possession in a forcible detainer proceeding is still controlled
by the shorter period fixed by the special statute' and is not
as long as that granted in the ordinary civil action. As a consequence of that fact, the appeal taken therein was dismissed
for notice and bond were not filed in five days although they
were filed within thirty days after decision on a motion to vacate
2
the judgment.
95 334 Il. App. 287, 79 N. E. (2d) 306 (1948).
96 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174(7).

97 334 Ill. App. 522, 79 N. E. (2d) 85 (1948).
98 It was claimed therein that the summons was improperly issued inasmuch as
the judgment creditor, petitioning for revival of a judgment, had not included any
prayer for process in his affidavit, hence had failed to comply with Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 83, § 24b. At the foot of the affidavit, however, there did appear, over the
signature of the creditor's attorney, a sufficient designation of the return day.
99 332 Ill. App. 301, 75 N. E. (2d) 140 (1947).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 57, § 19.
2 The court there expressed some uncertainty as to whether the appeal period was
to be measured from the date of the judgment or the date of the action taken on the
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Not only must the appeal be providently taken but it must
be taken from the final order which the litigant desires to have
reviewed. It became vitally important, therefore, in Sanford v.
Thompson,8 for the court to determine whether or not an appeal
might be taken from an order overruling a motion to vacate a
decree. The appellant therein had failed to seek review of the
original decree pronounced in the cause within the time permitted
by law, 4 so the only chance to procure review would be through
appeal from the order denying the motion. The court held that
such an order constituted a final and appealable order as it served
to terminate the litigation between the parties, but it announced
that the only questions open to review were those bearing on the
propriety of denying the motion. 5
Only one case has had anything of significance to say on the
subject of appellate procedure. It would seem, from Rule 34
of the Illinois Supreme Court, that the record on appeal ought to
contain not only the notice of appeal but all pertinent facts concerning service thereof and of its prompt filing within apt time,
inasmuch as the rule directs that "no action shall be taken"
with respect to an appeal until such evidence or proof has been
filed." The Supreme Court, however, in the case of Joyce v.
Blankenship,7 denied a motion to dismiss the appeal taken therein, based on the ground that the abstract failed to show this pertinent information, because it did disclose that the notice of appeal was filed within the ninety days fixed by law.8 The court
motion to vacate. It is understood that the Appellate Court for the First District, in
Atlas Finishing Co. v. Anderson, 336 Ill. App. 167, 83 N. E. (2d) 177 (1949), not in
the period of this survey, with Niemeyer, J., dissenting, seems to have decided that
the period is to be measured from the date of the judgment even though a purported motion for new trial, but essentially a motion to vacate, was still pending.
3397 Ill. 353, 74 N. E. (2d) 534 (1947).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 200.
5 Denial of the motion was there declared proper because appellant had filed the
motion in apt time but had failed to verify the motion as required by Ill. Rev. Stat.
1947, Ch. 110, § 174(7).
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 259.34(3).
7 399 Ill. 136, 77 N. E. (2d) 325 (1948).
8111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 259.34(1) (a).
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also noted that the rule concerning the obligation of appellant to
provide a statement of the errors relied upon in the concluding
paragraph of the statement of the case, to be set forth in appellant's brief, was not one of jurisdictional character, although compliance therewith would promote an orderly presentation of the
appeal, so long as an assignment of errors does appear in the
abstract of the record.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

Failure to convert an appeal into a supersedeas, pursuant to
Section 82 of the Civil Practice Act,9 may have far-reaching
effects according to the holding in Sanders v. Strauss.10 The
creditor there had obtained an attachment against land for a
debt due from the vendor who had sold on installment contract.
The vendee was served as garnishee so as to reach the unpaid
balance due on the contract. Upon trial, the attachment proceeding was dismissed and the garnishee discharged. Appeal
was taken from that order but no notice of appeal was served
on the garnishee nor was the appeal made to serve as a supersedeas. In time, the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded, eventually to result in a judgment in favor of the creditor, upon which special execution was issued. The garnishee had,
in the meantime, paid the balance of the contract price to the
vendor and had received a deed to the property in question. It
was held that such title was saved, under Section 76 of the Civil
Practice Act," from the lien of the judgment inasmuch as the
garnishee was treated as not being a party to the action, hence not
chargeable with notice of any errors in the original proceeding
nor of the likelihood that the initial decision would be abrogated
by a subsequent reversal. 12 There being no supersedeas, the
9 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 206.
10332 Ill. App. 314, 75 N. E. (2d) 128 (1947).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
12 The court distinguished the instant case from the holding in First National
Bank of Jonesboro v. Road Dist. No. 8, 389 Ill. 156, 58 N. E. (2d) 884 (1945), on
the ground the bank there concerned was retained as a party.
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vendee was declared free to complete the purchase without being
affected by the subsequent reversal. 18
An assignee of a judgment, or the assignee of a certificate
of sale, who has given notice of his rights by suitable filing is
entitled to all the benefits, including the right to notice, enjoyed
by the original judgment creditor or purchaser at the judgment
sale. 1 4 For that reason, he must be named as a party to any
suit brought by a senior creditor designed to affect his rights in
the debtor's property. The case of Hartsman v. Kaindl,15 however, introduces an important qualification in the law where
the judgment, or the certificate of sale, relates to property registered under the Torrens system. A judgment had there been
pronounced against the owner of registered lands and a transcript of the judgment had been duly filed with the Registrar of
Titles. In due course, a sale was had to the judgment creditor
and a certificate of sale was issued which was likewise registered.
Thereafter, the certificate was assigned to the plaintiff but he
took no steps to have any memorial shown on the Torrens record reflecting his interest in the property. Subsequently, the
holder of a prior mortgage sued to foreclose and named the
original judgment creditor, being the apparent certificate holder,
as a party to that suit. Upon foreclosure sale, title eventually
came to rest in one of the defendants who induced the Registrar
of Titles to issue a Torrens certificate omitting any reference to
the earlier memorials concerning the judgment and the certificate of sale issued thereunder. Plaintiff then sued to have these
memorials restored in his favor. An adverse decree was affirmed
when the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to take proper steps to assert his rights under the judgment inasmuch as he had not filed the affidavit stating his adverse interest authorized by either Section 90 or Section 92 of
the Title Registration Act. 16 One might suppose that compliance
13 But see comment on Cairo Lumber Co., Inc. v. Corwin, 325 Il1.
N. E. (2d) 110 (1945), in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviw 21-2.
14 II. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 77, § 30.
15400 Ill. 243, 79 N. E. (2d) 472 (1948):
16 Il. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 30, §§ 127 and 129.

App. 319, 60

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1947-1948

with the sections concerning execution liens 17 would bo enough,
but the court felt otherwise.
An aftermath of the holding of the Illinois Appellate Court
in Gibbons v. Caonaven,'s which had affirmed a judgment in favor
of plaintiff and against the tavern-keeper in a dram shop case
despite appellant's claim, as owner of the premises, of a violation of due procees, may be observed in the case of Gibbons v.
Brandt.19 The judgment creditor there sued to enforce the lien
of the earlier judgment 20 against premises owned by the appellant in the prior suit, he not having been the operator of the
tavern nor a party to the earlier proceedings. The owner of the
property urged that the lien of the judgment was invalid because
(a) the judgment had been obtained by fraud,21 and (b) because
the building in which the sale of liquor had occurred had since
been destroyed by fire. The federal district judge admitted that
there was some evidence of false testimony in the first proceeding as to the measure of the damage sustained but could find no
collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant therein nor any
fraud perpetrated on the court in order to get it to exercise its
jurisdiction, hence felt himself without power to review that issue in the lien proceedings. On the second point, the court conceived it to have been the legislative intent to subject the entire
premises, land and building, to the lien of the unpaid judgment
so that the mere destruction of the original structure did not
alter the liability nor the right to enforce the lien by a sale of
the land together with any new buildings which might have been
placed thereon.
17 Ibid., § 123 et seq.
18325 Il. App. 337, 60 N. E. (2d) 254 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rgvrnw 37.

19 75 F. Supp. 42 (1947).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 43, § 135. creates a special lien against "the building
or premises" which were devoted to the sale of alcoholic liquor.
21 The statute in question declares that it shall be a defense to a suit to enforce
the lien that "the judgment was recovered by fraud."
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IV.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Questions concerning the substance of criminal law are usually outnumbered by issues of procedure. The few cases which
did involve substantive law produced no major changes. The
defendant in People v. Brown,1 charged with burglary, argued
that the indictment should be quashed as the building which had
been broken into and entered was a gasoline filling station rendering day and night service and was actually open for business
at the time. The court did not agree that these facts, whether
treated singly or taken together, would remove defendant's case
2
from the scope of the statute.
Another borderline situation arose in People v. Berry." Defendant there was convicted of robbery for having pulled a gun
on the players at a poker game and seizing the money stakes lying
in the center of the playing table. It was contended that, at the
moment of taking, the stakes were not the property of any one
player and therefore could not possibly be stolen from any particular person. The court refused to undertake to define the ownership of the stakes in the uncompleted poker game as being unnecessary for the gist of the robbery lay in the use of force and
intimidation in taking, from the presence of another person and
against his will, property which belonged to him or was then in
his care or custody.
The important issue before the Appellate Court in City of
Chicago v. Terminiello,4 as reported last year, had been whether
the alleged breach of peace had actually occurred at a meeting
which was public in character. Affirmation of the conviction 5
on further review by the Supreme Court now serves to empha1397 Ill. 529, 74 N. E. (2d) 706 (1947).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 38, § 84.
3 399 Ill. 17, 76 N. E. (2d) 443 (1948), cert. den. 334 U. S. 821, 68 S. Ct. 1074,
92 L. Ed. 1043 (1948).
4 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E. (2d) 45 (1947), noted in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVrEw 50.
5400 Ill. 23, 79 N. E. (2d) 39 (1948), cert. granted - U. S. -, 69 S. Ct. 245,
93 L. Ed. 194 (1949).

